The enjoyment of art, as the disinterested cognition devoid of Will, can afford an interval of rest from the drudgery of Will service.
If it be by chance that intelligence meets them, the cognition of them will also be accidental and transient.
Otherwise, any cognition of intelligibles is made impossible, and the reality of both them and Intelligence itself is destroyed.
If it is desired to attribute some sort of cognition or sensation to nature, these will resemble true cognition and sensation only as those of a man who is awake resemble those of a man who is asleep.
The explanation that cognition operates by union of the intelligence with the intelligible depends on explanation of the bond that unites them.
But already before this the light has reached the object without any medium; so that the later contact operated by a medium would produce cognition by a sort of memory or reasoning--which is not the case.
What if they employ not free agents, nor yet inanimate instruments, but agents endowed with sense cognition and sense appetite, to produce effects?
It is not the cognition of the good, however, that moves the agent to act, it is not the idea of the good that the agent desires or strives for, but the good itself.
Now all our knowledge comes through the senses; and sense cognition is excited in us by the direct action of material or phenomenal being on our sense faculties.
The process of cognition has indeed its difficulties and mysteries.
Still their mental effort must have been unconsciously governed by those fixed laws of cognition which constrain all minds to regard all phenomena as the expression of power, and all orderly arrangement as the utterance of thought.
Finite consciousness can be developed only under conditions of plurality, difference, and succession, and therefore the objects of cognition must be successively presented.
We must regard it as a philosophic canon that an experience cognition can not conflict with an intuitive belief.
Sense is the mind's acting in the direct cognition either of material objects or of its own mental states.
Indeed such a line of reasoning would be suicidal; as the cognition that the moral faculty is developed is certainly later in development than moral cognition, and would therefore, by this reasoning, be less trustworthy.
I see no reason to believe that the 'original' element of our moral cognitioncan be ascertained; but if it could, I see no reason to hold that it would be especially free from error.
And can what comes out of your own cognition become a part of the cognition of another?
The cognition now, and the cognition then, are two separate acts of the mind; and the question arises, Are the objects distinct, as well as the cognitions?
There is reference always in such cases to other objects of the same kind, sort, and description, a series of which the object of present cognition is one, and to which series it holds the same relation now that it held formerly.
We have thus far treated of that power of the mind by which it takes cognizance of objects as directly presented to sense, and also of that by which it represents to itself former objects of cognition in their absence.
According to Hamilton, perception is not, as held by Reid and others, the conception of an object suggested by sensation, but the direct cognition of something.
This, like the former, is an intellectual act, a perception or cognition of a truth, of a reality for which we have the same voucher as for any other reality or apprehended fact, viz.
Cognition of something external to the Organism itself.
If the cognition or belief can be resolved into several cognitions or beliefs, it is complex, and so, no longer original.
Philosophy first raised these conceptions to the idea of the State, which fashioned the cognition of Reason and of the reform which follows from its idea, into an organic element in itself.
In the same way the cognition of water in the mirage is true.
If the cognitionof fire which rests on mist being mistaken for smoke is false, it follows that the object of that cognition, viz.
Moreover, if all cognitions are empty of real content, you are unable to prove what you wish to prove since your inferential cognition also is devoid of true content.
On that doctrine we, further, could not account for the use of the instruments of cognition (i.
You will perhaps rejoin that consciousness is not false because it (alone) is not sublatcd by that cognitionwhich sublates everything else.
The cognition by the mind of the mind's own work; and in this are comprised the acts of consciousness and all the purely ideal objects which we create in it.
Thus guided by objective and necessary truths, which are the laws of our understanding, the type of the relations of beings, and consequently a sure standard of them, we ascend by reasoning to the cognition of things themselves.
The object of this direct act is not the me; the fundamental principle of the cognition therefore is not the me, as the object known, but only as the necessary condition, since there cannot be thought without a thinking subject.
Science is the cognitionof the mode in which the thing is made; a cognition in which the mind makes its object, since it recomposes its elements.
The reflex act is only a cognitionof a cognition, feeling, or some other internal phenomenon; and therefore all reflection upon consciousness presupposes a prior direct act.
Is every human cognition reduced to the simple perception of identity?
There can be no cognition without this representation; without conformity, there is no truth, cognition is a pure illusion to which nothing corresponds, and the human understanding is unceasingly the sport of vain appearances.
As to taste and smell also, we must distinguish between the experience and the cognition of it; this latter cognition constitutes sensation, or a judgment of the experience, and differs therefrom entirely.
The cognition of intelligible things still less admits of an experience or impression; for the soul finds the intelligible things within herself, while it is outside of herself that she contemplates sense-objects.
A special mind and gifts are not needed for the cognition and exposition of the truth, but for the invention and exposition of the lie.
And so, for the cognition and the expression of truth, there is no need of any especial prominent capacity, but only of the faith that reason is not only the highest divine quality of man, but also the only tool for the cognition of truth.
Once more: "The faculty of sensibility not only does not present us with any indistinct and confused cognition of objects as things in themselves, but, in fact, gives us no knowledge of these at all.
This doubt he invokes in all those turns of thought and phrase in which he suggests that if an idea is in the mind it cannot have its counterpart elsewhere, and that a given cognition exhausts and contains its object.
If intelligence is assumed to be an organ ofcognition and a vehicle for truth, a given hypothesis about the causes of perception can only be discarded when a better hypothesis on the same subject has been supplied.
All objects envisaged either in vulgar action or in the airiestcognition must be at first ideal and distinct from the given facts, otherwise action would have lost its function at the same moment that thought lost its significance.
This is called also the cognoscent soul, from its cognitionof recondite and mysterious truths).
The cognitionand nescience of the world, are the causes of the bondage and liberation of the soul, and these again are productive of the transmigration and final emancipation of the animal spirit.
This it is which brings order into the chaos of representations awakened by the association of ideas, and makes them subserve the purposes of cognition and judgment.
But this enriching of organized unconscious cognitionrepresents a higher degree of development than many human beings attain to.
Thus aversion is always the instinctive, or conscious cognition of a noxious influence.
But may there not be Opinion and Cognition respecting the same matters?
Wherever there iscognition (he argues), there must exist an eternal and unchangeable object of cognition, apart from particulars, which are changeable and perishable.
What you already know by the first of these grades, you cannot be said to learn; but you may learn that which you know only by the second grade, and by such learning you bring your incomplete cognition up to completeness.
Every such definition, if good, implies in a certain way the definition of the contrary: he who defines cognition furnishes by implication the definition of ignorance.
Thus, if the respondent grants that there exist cognitions both estimable and worthless, you are warranted in inferring that there exist habits of mind estimable and worthless; for cognition is a species under the genus habit of mind.
It is not correct to say that cognition of the Particular is more complete, or bears more upon real existence, than cognition of the Universal.
With many animals, the data of perception are transient, and soon disappear altogether, so that the cognition of such animals consists in nothing but successive acts of sensible perception.
Without denying the distinction of the two, as conceivable and nameable, he maintained that truth and cognition required that they should be looked at in implication with each other.
If you wish to show that belief is the genus to which cognition belongs, you must examine whether the cognoscens believes qua cognoscens.
It is there contended that Cognitio per se (the Idea) must be far more complete and accurate than any cognition which we possess.
But may we not meet these difficulties by replying that there are some things in which Cognition is identical with the Cognitum?
Thus the Form of Cognition correlates with the Form of Truth; and the Form of each variety of Cognition, with the Form of the corresponding variety of Truth.
In the first place there are certain principles of cognition which appear to rest upon and to express relations of the universal elements in conscious experience, viz.
How then are the primary data of mathematical cognition to be derived from an experience containing space and time relations in the manner just stated?
It was left for Hume to approach the theory of knowledge with full consciousness from the psychological point of view, and to work out the final consequences of that view so far as cognition is concerned.
For here we have to consider how the individual intelligence comes to know any fact whatsoever, and what is meant by the cognition of a fact.
The foundations of cognition must be discovered by observation or analysis of experience so conceived.
It does not seem necessary to endeavour to follow his minute examination of the principle of real cognition with the same fulness.
If the relations involved in the fact of cognition are only those discoverable by observation of any particular portion of known experience, then such relations are quite external and contingent.
Now if this mode of treatment be accepted as the only possible method, and its results assumed to be conclusive as regards the problem of knowledge, the fundamental peculiarity of cognition is overlooked.
For in the problem of real cognition he is brought face to face with the characteristic feature of knowledge, distinction of self from matters known, and reference of transitory states to permanent objects or relations.
Platonism had created an intellectual and intelligible world, wherein a dissolving dialectic turned the cognition of material phenomena into a reflection of the mind's ideals.
It was a finite will, inasmuch as the conditioning cognition was finite, perfect of its kind, adequate to its task, never faltering, yet of finite strength.
He does not see that personality lies deeper than will, and that will and cognition are co-ordinate attributes of nature.
On the other it may mean thought unrelated to experience, one whose implications are not or cannot be fully deduced, in fact, the incomplete cognition of an idea.
Such a devil as witchcraft was imputed to, and who was believed to put forth greater power over all Indian and heathen lands than God exercised there, receives cognition in few brains to-day.
A class of agents are now at work whose cognition may some day turn the laugh upon overweeningly wise laughers at Cotton Mather.
But however subtle the object it contemplates may become, it does not depart from its contemplative attitude, andcognition is but a consciousness.
The impression on which the act of cognition operates, that impression which is directly produced by the excitant of the nervous system, seems to me, without any doubt, to be of an entirely physical nature.
As for myself, I shall also continue to make a distinction between what I have called objects ofcognition and acts of cognition, because this is the most general distinction that can be traced in the immense field of our cognitions.
The excitement, for instance, will be suppressed, and the cognition will be retained.
It is an indirect cognition which causes us to comprehend matter; we have of this last only a relative and apparent notion, which sufficiently explains how it may differ from a phenomenon of thought.
It consists in supposing that there really exist two ways of arriving at the cognition of objects: the within and the without.
These laws are not recognised, popularly speaking, either in physics or in biology; they constitute for us a cognition apart from that of the natural world.
Each of these factors represents a different property: the external object represents a cognition and the nervous system an excitement.
Lastly, to take account of the meaning of these differences, and to explain them, it is pointed out that they are probably connected with the modes of cognition which intervene to comprehend the mental and the physical.
To form or image again in consciousness, as an object of cognition or apprehension (something which was originally apprehended by direct presentation).
