But for the general conception of psychic action, and especially of the cognitive functions, which interests us at present, it is not necessary to have this delimitation of the regions.
At the same time, we know that these cognitive organs, and the knowledge they bring us, are imperfect, and that there may be other features of organisms that lie beyond our means of perception altogether.
This transformation is effected in the post-Kantians by a generalization of the humancognitive consciousness.
In the religion of enlightenment the divine attitude tends to belong to the poetry and eloquence of religion rather than to its cognitive intent.
I may say, in short, that God or being, is my perfect cognitive self.
The nature that is known is on that very account phenomenal, anthropocentric--created by its cognitive conditions.
And without attaching cognitive importance to this realm, the system is utterly dogmatic in its epistemology.
Hence to complete an account of religion one should consider its object, or its cognitive implications.
If, on the other hand, it be found that the aim of natural science is such as to exclude certain aspects of reality, then philosophy will not be restricted to logical criticism, but will have a cognitive field of its own.
The believing experience is cognitive in intent, but practical and emotional as well in content.
If we revert again to the cognitive aspect of religion, it is evident that there is but one test to apply: whatever either fortifies or misleads the will is literal conviction.
We conclude, then, our attempt to emphasize the cognitive factor in religion, with the thesis that every religion centres in a practical secret of the universe.
Its truth must then be construed as relative to the interests of the thinker, as a symbolism which has an instrumental rather than a purely cognitive value.
Sidenote: The Post-Kantian Metaphysics is a Generalization of the Cognitive and Moral Consciousness as Analyzed by Kant.
The Post-Kantian Metaphysics is a Generalization of the Cognitive and Moral Consciousness as Analyzed by Kant.
Therefore the real, in order to be thinkable for us, must be the realized thought of the creative thinking of an eternal divine Reason which is presented to our cognitive thinking.
Its only peculiarity as a cognitive act of the reason is that it is conditioned by holy affection.
It may include illumination, or the quickening of man's cognitive powers to understand truth already revealed.
The argument from cognitive interests will be empty when there is no cognitive interest.
The Scriptures clearly distinguish between revelation, or the communication of new truth, and illumination, or the quickening of man's cognitive powers to perceive truth already revealed.
That our cognitive faculties correspond to things as they are, is much less surprising than that they should correspond to things as they are not.
We grant that this understanding of divine things is impossible without a quickening of man's cognitive powers.
We claim that it cannot be derived from any other source than an original cognitive power of the mind.
Cognitive sentiency is dichotomised as proceeding discriminately and as proceeding indiscriminately.
It is of two degrees according to its nature as cognitive or incognitive.
It has thus been said by the son of Udayakara-- "What self-luminous self can affirm or deny that self-active and cognitive is Mahesvara the primal being?
He who is worn out with decrepitude, though he be free from cough, from asthma, and similar infirmities, "He is not qualified for meditation in whom the activities of the cognitive organs are obstructed.
This division of mind into the three great classes of the cognitive faculties, the feelings, .
It is indifferent whether we say that Objects are divided into such and such classes, or that such and such different cognitive faculties are peculiar to the Subject.
Movement induced by motives is necessarily wanting where there is no cognitive faculty, and movement by stimuli alone remains, i.
Cognitive therapy, discussed in Chapter 10, is especially concerned with this influence of thoughts on emotions.
Yet mental evaluations and ideas are given so much power that cognitive habits are responsible for emotional responses.
By telling ourselves things like these, we create our own unhappiness, frustration, and anger; that is the point of view of cognitive therapy.
Cognitive therapy is important among these; we will discuss its purpose and methods later.
Rational-emotive therapy is the most widespread approach to cognitive therapy, so we will examine Ellis's approach in some detail.
Behavior modification andcognitive approaches to behavior change are frequently used in groups.
Thus the beautiful and its representation in art procures for intuition what philosophy gives to the cognitive insight and religion to the believing frame of mind.
In this analysis of the cognitive faculty, the object only exists relatively to the subject and to the feeling of pleasure or the enjoyment that it experiences.
When we consider of what value it is to a rational being to be independent of natural laws, we see how much man finds in the liberty of sublime objects as a set-off against the checks of his cognitive faculty.
It is an error to reduce all objects and all activities, all thinking beings and all objects of our thought, to mechanism and its products and by-products, thus explaining away the peculiar nature of man as a conative and cognitive being.
The argument then becomes the following: consciousness of a world of mutually external things demands, in presentations, a cognitive but non-inferential element leading to the discrimination of the objects presented.
When pleasure and pain are marked off as belonging only to the desire nature, the objection arises: "Well, but in the exercise of the cognitive faculty there is an intense pleasure.
Of course, from the Eastern standpoint, sensation is a mental function also, for the senses are part of the cognitive faculty, but they are unfortunately classed with feelings in Western psychology.
If doubt be cast upon the veracity of the primary cognitive faculties of the mind, the flood-gates of universal skepticism are opened.
Objection 1: It would seem that hope belongs to the cognitive power.
But since the cognitive power moves the appetite, by presenting its object to it; there arise in the appetite various movements according to various aspects of the apprehended object.
External sense perceives only what is present; but the interior cognitive power can perceive the present, past and future.
But hope is not in the cognitive power, but in the appetite, as stated above (A.
Further, ignorance does not belong to the will but to the cognitive power.
Because experience belongs to thecognitive power; wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic.
When a man desires a thing and reckons that he can get it, he believes that he can get it, he believes that he will get it; and from this belief which precedes in thecognitive power, the ensuing movement in the appetite is called confidence.
But awaiting seems to belong to the cognitive power, which we exercise by looking out.
Wherefore the movement of hope is sometimes called expectation, on account of the preceding inspection of the cognitive power.
But confidence, like faith, seems to belong to the cognitive power.
Here emerges the third element in our problem: The function of thought as furnishing objectivity to any experience that claims cognitive reference or capacity.
Assurance, cognitive validation, and guaranteeship, follow from it, but are not coincident with its occurrence.
Such an experience neither is, in whole or in part, a knowledge, nor does it exercise a cognitive function.
That it is possible to carry on successfully, at least to some extent, this work of discrimination between the subjective and the objective factors of our cognitive experience, can scarcely be denied.
They are modes, or forms, or terms, of the cognitive activity itself, not of the reality which is the object apprehended and contemplated by means of this cognitive activity.
Or are all relations merely logical, pure creations of our cognitive activity?
When certain distinctions are held to be real this consideration is emphasized: that in the cognitive process, as such, it is the mind that is assimilated to the objective reality.
Cognitive and appetitive faculties do not react on the objects which reduce these faculties to act, thus arousing their immanent activity.
It is certainly impossible for us to know what, or what kind, reality is, or whether it is one or manifold, apart from and prior to, the exercise of our own cognitive activity.
Clinician signifies a particular mode of being and a particular kind of cognitive knowledge.
These items were categorized under broad cognitive and affective domains.
The affective domain knowledge areas were a dynamic internalized synthesis of several knowledge areas from the cognitive domain.
Thus, the expression of these affective knowledge areas was evidence of the practice of nursing as an artful form of expressing cognitive knowing.
Of course realistic forms may be aesthetically significant, and out of them an artist may create a superb work of art, but it is with their aesthetic and not with their cognitive value that we shall then be concerned.
To help the spectator to appreciate our design we have introduced into our picture a representative or cognitive element.
The cognitive or representative element in a work of art can be useful as a means to the perception of formal relations and in no other way.
In short, there is no facultative plurality in the mind; it is a single organ of true judgment for all purposes, cognitive or practical.
We have, in other words, been assuming that language moves entirely in the ideational or cognitive sphere.
Do purely cognitive states give rise to such movements, or does the movement impulse depend more particularly upon the affective consciousness accompanying the cognitive states?
The ordinary doctrine of self-interest usually omits altogether the cognitive function.
The cognitive processes, and the actual bodily movements by which the instinct achieves its end may be indefinitely complicated.
The above list will hopefully give you a few useful examples demonstrating the appropriate usage of "cognitive" in a variety of sentences. We hope that you will now be able to make sentences using this word.
