We have already said that man or the moral agent is free, when he is in a condition to choose between right and wrong, and able to do either at his will.
This principle, by virtue of which we declare a moral agent deserving of happiness or unhappiness according to his good or bad actions, is called the principle of merit and demerit.
He who acts and is capable of doing the right and the wrong, and who consequently is held to obey the moral law, is called a moral agent.
No conception of God is of the smallest religious value which does not contemplate him as being a moral agent and a being on whose actions a moral character of some kind must be impressed.
A miracle, in any sense in which it enters into the present argument, is not only an abnormal objective fact, but one which takes place at the bidding of a moral agent.
Now, how does the historian so easily demonstrate that the doctrine of necessity, as held by the reformers, does not deny the liberty of a moral agent?
In the Scriptures, man is addressed as a moral agent, the subject of commands and prohibitions, of obligation, of merit and demerit, and consequently of reward and punishment.
For man, as well as an observer and understander of other men, is also a moral agent.
The commands of duty must be derived solely from the nature of man as a moral agent.
Man regards himself as a moral agent, morally responsible for his conduct, and he regards others as morally responsible, whatever his or their particular nature or character may be.
If the sinner has not this power, then he is not a moral agent in his conversion.
A moral agent is one who, with a knowledge of the right and wrong, exercises the power of action.
And in this case the sinner is not a moral agent, for in moral agency the sinner, with a knowledge of the right and the wrong, begins the work himself and does it himself.
It accords too with consciousness; and is, in fact, the only theory on which the responsibility of a moral agent can be predicated.
A moral agent, to be free, must be possessed of a self-determining principle.
He could not be a moral agent, any more than a tree or a stone.
For if man be not a moral agent, he cannot be responsible for the present position of the world; and it would be unjust in God to punish him for acts that were not his, and for circumstances over which he had no control.
Thus we see that the first quality of the acts of a moral agent is that he think, desire, say and do with knowledge and free consent.
A moral agent is one who, in the conduct of his life, is capable of good and evil, and who, in consequence of this faculty of choosing between right and wrong is responsible to God for the good and evil he does.
But before he has any opportunity of acting, at the instant of his creation, I humbly conceive that no moral agent is either to be praised or blamed for any disposition with which he may have been endowed by his Maker.
I am willing to admit, that he "was brought into existence capable of acting immediately as a moral agent; and, therefore, he was immediately under a rule of right action.
This sentiment is still more explicitly declared in the following words; "In a moral agent, subject to moral obligations, it is the same thing to be perfectly innocent, as to be perfectly righteous.
The very possibility of such a faculty or power is conditioned in all the human faculties of intelligence, sensibility and choice, in which man becomes a moral agent.
This conception of the positiveness of his total moral organization is necessary to complete the view of man as a moral agent.
The sun is very excellent and beneficial in its action and influence on the earth, in warming it, and causing it to bring forth its fruits; but it is not a moral agent.
A moral agent is a being that is capable of those actions that have a moral quality, and which can properly be denominated good or evil in a moral sense, virtuous or vicious, commendable or faulty.
Fire that breaks out in a city, and consumes great part of it, is very mischievous in its operation; but is not a moral agent.
Hence, man as a moral agent is always the centre of his own horizon, and stands right beneath the zenith.
As a moral agent, and a moral agent man always is, he not only may, but must have his working hypothesis, and that hypothesis must be all-inclusive.
So powerful is his interest in man as a moral agent, that he sees nought else in the world of any deep concern.
Now it follows from this, that, whenever we consider man as a moral agent, that is, as an agent who converts ideas into actual things, the need of a philosophy becomes evident.
The above list will hopefully provide you with a few useful examples demonstrating the appropriate usage of "moral agent" in a variety of sentences. We hope that you will now be able to make sentences using this group of words.
