The preceding considerations enable us to understand the true nature of what is termed, by recent writers, Formal Logic, and the relation between it and Logic in the widest sense.
The end aimed at by Formal Logic, and attained by the observance of its precepts, is not truth, but consistency.
But his method of so doing still ultimately consists in an appeal to the results of the metaphysical deduction, and therefore rests upon his untenable belief in the adequacy of formal logic.
Kant here frankly departs from the classification of judgments followed in formal logic; and the reason which he gives for so doing is in direct contradiction to his demand that only the form of judgment must be taken into account.
Kant compares metaphysics to mathematics and physics on the one hand, and to formal logic on the other.
The most general logical principles which have appeared in the historical development of formal logic are definition, self-evidence, inference, and observation.
What is called formal logic is animated with the hope of extracting these formulations directly from an analysis of the procedure of thought.
That regarding universals, or general ideas, pertains to philosophy, and, from the standpoint of formal logic, lies at the foundations of consistent thinking.
Then Aristotle's De interpretatione, in two editions, the first with simple comment suited to beginners, the second with the best elaboration of formal logic that he could devise or compile.
Curiously enough this conclusion is fully confirmed by Formal Logic.
It stands to reason that such an evaluation cannot operate merely with the criteria of formal logic.
Here again I am not asking for a reason, in the strict sense of Formal Logic; I am merely asking for a proposition which would probably not be true, unless what I asserted were true.
The reasoning proceeds by the strict rules of formal logic from a set of axioms laid down to begin with.
Throughout the Middle Ages, almost all the best intellects devoted themselves to formal logic, whereas in the nineteenth century only an infinitesimal proportion of the world's thought went into this subject.
These rules of inference constitute the major part of the principles of formal logic.
This cannot be otherwise, if one, as is here the case, wishes to establish results won in the realm of dialectics by means of formal logic.
It may be noted that the account cannot be merely inappropriate to the general problem, if it be incompatible with that assumed by Formal Logic.
Kant's mode of connecting the categories in detail with the forms of judgement discovered by Formal Logic is at least as surprising as his mode of connecting the latter with the nature of judgement in general.
Kant, however, makes no attempt to show that each form of judgement distinguished by Formal Logic involves a special conception.
No names are such that their meaning is rendered evident by the very constitution of our mental faculties; yet nothing short of this would suffice to bring the material content of definition within the province of formal logic.
The material correctness of a definition is, as we have already seen, a matter extraneous to formal logic.
Formal logic, however, cannot take account of the matter of propositions; and is therefore obliged to set down all indefinite propositions as particular, since it is not evident from the form that they are universal.
Hence division, being always founded on the possession or non-possession of accidental attributes, seems to lie wholly outside the sphere of formal logic.
Hamilton's Formal Logic; and some Fallacious Modes of Thought countenanced by Sir W.
We consider Mr Mill as the real preserver of all that is valuable in Formal Logic, from the unfortunate consequences of an erroneous estimate, brought upon it through the exaggerated pretensions of logicians.
This is not only a contention fatal to the pragmatic claims, but also bound up with other assumptions of Formal Logic.
At this point he joins forces with Mr. Alfred Sidgwick, who has long been urging a radical criticism of the procedures of Formal Logic, and shown the gulf between them and the processes of concrete thought.
Meaning' is propounded by the failure of Formal Logic.
Formal logic or dialectic, as cultivated by Abaelard for example, appears as an exception.
We have spoken at some length of the logical studies of Gerbert, and his endeavours to adjust his thinking and classify the branches of knowledge by means of formal logic.
And in categories of formal logic he sought to rationalize every matter apprehended by his mind.
To realise this is to understand more clearly the limitations of Formal Logic.
If it is contended that such excursions are beyond the bounds of Formal Logic, the answer is that the exercise is a useful one and that it starts naturally and conveniently from the formulae of Logic.
But historically this is the origin of the Modals of Formal Logic, and to divert the names of them to signify other distinctions than those between modes of qualifying the certainty of a statement is to introduce confusion.
The fact only is that nothing beyond the logical Law of Contradiction needs to be assumed for any of the processes of Formal Logic.
The above list will hopefully provide you with a few useful examples demonstrating the appropriate usage of "formal logic" in a variety of sentences. We hope that you will now be able to make sentences using this group of words.
