He who has given up the sight of the visibles from his view, and does not allow the sensibles to obtrude upon his senses, is said to have renounced all and every thing from himself.
His distinction of Proper and Common Sensibles appears at first to contradict Berkeley's doctrine of the heterogeneity of the ideal visible and the real tangible worlds.
In the present case, however, I cannot see that it does hold, and therefore, so far as a priori reasons go, I conclude that there is no reason why sensibles should not exist at times when they are not experienced.
We may now, therefore, raise the question: Do sensibles ever exist at times when they are not being experienced at all?
But thatsensibles ever have this kind of relation to my mental acts, is a thing which I cannot believe.
We saw before that it seems possible that all these sensibles do really exist at times when they are not experienced, and that some people, at all events, seem to have a strong propensity to believe that they do.
And the natural view to take as to the status of sensibles generally, relatively to physical objects, would be that none of them, whether experienced or not, were ever in the same place as any physical object.
To this view I can see no objection except the serious one that it is difficult to answer the questions: How can I ever come to know that these sensibles have a "source" at all?
And this is proved to be false especially from the fact that if a man be wanting in a sense, he cannot have any knowledge of the sensibles corresponding to that sense.
But the common sensiblesare all reducible to quantity.
For the proper sensibles first, and of their very nature, affect the senses; since they are qualities that cause alteration.
Therefore the common sensibles do not move the senses first and of their own nature, but by reason of the sensible quality; as the surface by reason of color.
But the impulses of other animals are uniform and spontaneous, are moved together with the sensible organs, and require the senses alone that they may obtain from sensibles the pleasurable, and avoid the painful.
Wherefore the entire consideration of speculative sciences cannot extend farther than knowledge of sensibles can lead.
Consequently man alone, who is a perfectly cognizant animal, takes pleasure in the objects of the other senses for their own sake; whereas other animals take no pleasure in them save as referable to the sensibles of touch, as stated in Ethic.
Hence it follows that nothing external can be a cause of sin, except by moving the reason, as a man or devil by enticing to sin; or by moving the sensitive appetite, as certain external sensibles move it.
Whereas he ascribes the "straight" movement in the soul to the soul's proceeding from exteriorsensibles to the knowledge of intelligible objects.
For in other animals pleasures do not result from the other senses save in relation to sensibles of touch: thus the lion is pleased to see the stag, or to hear its voice, in relation to his food.
The above list will hopefully give you a few useful examples demonstrating the appropriate usage of "sensibles" in a variety of sentences. We hope that you will now be able to make sentences using this word.