The movements, in other words, give rise to conscious states, and these in turn are retained as portions of past experience.
Although the mind, even in such sub-conscious states, would seem to exercise some slight attention, it is yet evident that it does not exercise a definite selective control during such passive states of consciousness.
The objection has been repeated in the metaphorical language in which Huxley and Taine speak of the soul, the living soul, as nothing more than a republic of conscious states, or the movement of a luminous sheaf etc.
Objects occupying space are marked out as external to one another, but this cannot be said of conscious states.
The associationist reduces the self to an aggregate of conscious states, sensations, feelings, and ideas.
Even to speak of “several” conscious states interpenetrating is to characterize them numerically, and so interrelate and mutually externalize or spatialize them.
Finally, the organization of conscious states is nothing like the traditional systematic “coördination” of associationistic psychology.
In the last analysis, all differences in value, including all moral distinctions, rest upon this disparity in the immediate worth of conscious states.
The above list will hopefully provide you with a few useful examples demonstrating the appropriate usage of "conscious states" in a variety of sentences. We hope that you will now be able to make sentences using this group of words.