For the Irascible passions do follow the temper of the heart, but the concupiscible distractions the crasis of the liver.
SN: Whence the irascible, whence the concupiscible Passions do most arise.
On the contrary, Concupiscence is caused by love, and tends to pleasure, both of which are passions of the concupiscible faculty.
However, the fact that love, which is concupiscible passion, inclines many to evil, is the reason why some assigned the difference spoken of.
The result would be that even things relating to the inclination of the concupiscible faculty belong to the natural law.
Therefore love is the first of the concupiscible passions.
Much more therefore should there be virtue in the will than in the irascible and concupiscible powers.
Consequently of all the concupiscible passions, concupiscence is felt most; and for this reason the power is named after it.
Jerome ascribes hatred of vice to the irascible faculty, not by reason of hatred, which is properly a concupiscible passion; but on account of the struggle, which belongs to the irascible power.
Hence both irascible and concupiscible can move counter to the will: and accordingly nothing hinders the will from being moved by them at times.
Consequently the concupiscible passions are specifically different from the irascible passions.
And to crave a thing under the aspect of something delightful to the senses, wherein concupiscence properly consists, belongs to the concupiscible power.
Accordingly the passions of the irascible faculty stand between those concupiscible passions that denote movement towards good or evil, and those concupiscible passions that denote rest in good or evil.
But not every passion is in the concupiscible power; indeed, fear, which is mentioned in this passage, is in the irascible power.
Wherefore the different passions of the concupiscible faculty do not require different moral virtues, because their movements follow one another in a certain order, as being directed to the one same thing, viz.
Concupiscible covets always pleasant and delightsome things, and abhors that which is distasteful, harsh, and unpleasant.
And in the same way the will may be said to be concupiscible on account of its desire for good.
All of this is done by their will, and not by the irascible or concupiscible appetite.
But hatred is contrary to love, and is in the concupiscible part.
Therefore we should distinguish irascible and concupiscible parts of the intellectual soul as well as in the sensitive.
Therefore it is clear that the universal reason directs the sensitive appetite, which is divided into concupiscible and irascible; and this appetite obeys it.
Whence it is that we experience that the irascible and concupiscible powers do resist reason, inasmuch as we sense or imagine something pleasant, which reason forbids, or unpleasant, which reason commands.
But the irascible and concupiscible powers denominate the sensitive appetite rather on the part of the act, to which they are led by the reason, as we have said.
Whether There Is an Irascible and a Concupiscible Appetite in the Angels?
Objection 1: It would seem that the sensitive appetite is not divided into the irascible and concupiscible as distinct powers.
Therefore the concupiscible and irascible are the same powers.
The great defect in the ethical system of Plato was the identification of evil with the inferior or corporeal nature of man--"the irascible and concupiscible elements," fashioned by the junior divinities.
The concupiscible appetite is broken in to reason by temperance residing within it.
Now the concupiscible appetite in every man, of its own nature, leans to its proper object of delectable good.
Plato lavishes all evil names on the steed that represents the concupiscible part.
For liberality regards expenditure in reference to the love and desire of money, which are passions of the concupiscible faculty, and do not hinder the liberal man from giving and spending: so that this virtue is in the concupiscible.
Hence justice is not about the passions, as are temperance and fortitude, which are in the irascible and concupiscible parts.
Therefore charity is also in the concupiscibleand not in the will.
Nevertheless the irascible understood in this broad sense is not distinct from the concupiscible power, as stated above in the First Part (Q.
Whether the Subject of Continence Is the Concupiscible Power?
Objection 1: It would seem that the subject of continence is the concupiscible power.
The will is more akin to the reason than the concupiscible power is.
Hence fortitude is properly in the irascible, while patience is in the concupiscible faculty.
Now the concupiscible has the same disposition in one who is continent and in one who is incontinent, since in both of them it breaks out into vehement evil desires.
The other principle of the sinful act is the proper and proximate principle which elicits the sinful act: thus the concupiscible is the principle of gluttony and lust, wherefore these sins are said to be in the concupiscible.
The concupiscible is a part of the sensitive, not of the intellective appetite, as proved in the First Part (Q.
But sorrow is in theconcupiscible part, even as joy is.
Therefore penance is in the concupiscible faculty.
The above list will hopefully give you a few useful examples demonstrating the appropriate usage of "concupiscible" in a variety of sentences. We hope that you will now be able to make sentences using this word.
